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A Survey of Leasing in Small Firms
Chenchuramaiah T. Bathala 
Tarun K. Mukherjee
This paper reports survey results regarding leasing practices of small firms. 
Small firms that lease are more likely to be relatively large manufacturing 
firms which exhibit higher debt ratios and higher sales growth. The survey 
responses as well as empirical analyses of pertinent data reveal that the 
relationship between debt and leasing is complementary. Unlike their larger 
counterparts, small firms seldom use text-book recommended lease-borrow 
decision models. Also, unlike large firms, small firms are more likely to offer 
“dubious” reasons, such as off-balance sheet accounting and 100 percent 
financing, as advantages of leasing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many questions pertinent to a firm’s leasing decision have intrigued 
researchers over the years. The questions include: What type of 
relationship exists between leasing and debt financing? What factors 
determine a firm’s choice of one alternative over the other? To what 
extent do firms employ prescribed theoretical models in making lease vs. 
borrow-buy decisions? In addressing these empirical questions, the 
research spodight has almost exclusively focused on large firms (see e.g., 
Bowman, 1980; Ang & Peterson, 1984; Finucane, 1988; and Mukherjee, 
1991) while small firms have received very little attention.
Lease financing is perhaps more critical to small firms than to their 
larger counterparts for several reasons. First, small firms have limited 
access to capital markets.^ Second, small firms are reluctant to make 
long-term commitments of fimds associated with a purchase as they are 
more vulnerable than large firms to changing technology. Also, 
relatively high insider ownership might induce small firms to rely on
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leasing in order to avoid divulging private information that lenders often 
require.
In this paper we attempt to shed some light on the way a small firm 
makes its leasing decision and to explore the extent to which such 
decision making process differs from a large firm. To a large extent, our 
approach is akin to that of Mukherjee (1991). However, while the object 
of Mukherjee’s survey was the leasing practices of the Fortune 500 firms, 
our focus is on small firms. In addition, this paper addresses some 
empirical issues not examined by Mukherjee (1991). The issues include 
the factors that differentiate between high-lease and low-lease firms and 
whether the debt-lease relationship in small firms is complementary or 
substitutive.
II. SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
We define “small firm” as a firm having between $10 and $500 millions 
in sales. Inclusion of all qualifying firms in the survey population may 
prove to be quite expensive. As such, we randomly select 862 firms from 
the 1991 Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. Private and Public 
Companies. This survey target is represented by firms in 13 different 
industry segments (4-digit SICs). Sales and employment data of these 
companies are furnished in Panel A of Table 1. The average sales for 
these firms is $62.95 million and the average number of employees is 
393. A vast majority of these firms (81.4%) are privately-held and 16.7 
percent of the firms are publicly-owned corporations.
After pre-testing the survey questionnaire, we mailed it in the early 
part of May, 1993, and followed it up with a reminder. We received 
usable responses firom a total of 104 firms which comprise the sample of 
our study. Summary statistics of the sample firms are presented in Panel 
B of Table 1. The sample is an approximate representation of the 
population. Approximately 74 percent of the sample firms have annual 
sales of less than $100 million. Of the respondents, 27.9 percent are 
publicly-held firms and 60.6 percent are privately-held firms. Firms in 
the manufacturing sector represent 38.5 percent of the sample. About 62 
percent of the sample firms are less than $50 million in asset size. Office 
equipment and machinery top the list of leased items (41 firms) followed 
by automobiles (33 firms), computers (25 firms) and plant, equipment, 
and buildings (23 firms).
Panel A of Table 2 shows that a majority of firms finance five percent 
or less of their total assets with lease. Although this number appears 
small, lease financing may be quite substantial as a percentage of total
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Table 1
Characteristics of the Survey Population and Respondents
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Population 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Sales ($ million) 62.95 88.91 9.00 500.00
No. of Employees 393 605 100 5,100
Panel B: Background Characteristics of Survey Respondents
Number Percent
1. Type of Business Organization (n = 104)
i) Publicly-owned Corporation 29 27.9
ii) Privately-owned Corporation 63 60.6
iv) Other 12 11.5
2. Type of Business Activity (n = 104)
i) Manufecturing 40 38.5
ii) Construction, Mining, Real Estate, and Transportation 19 18.3
iii) Utilities 20 19.2
iv) Other 25 24.0
3. Firm Size by Total Assets (n = 103)
i) Less than $10 million 24 23.3
ii) $11 - $50 million 40 38.8
iii) $51 - $100 million 12 11.7
iv) Over $100 million 27 26.2
4. Items Leased by Leasing Firms (n = 56)*
i) Automobiles 33
ii) Plant, Equipment, and Buildings 23
iii) Office Equip, and Machinery 41
iv) Computers 25
v) Land 4
vi) Others 13
Note: *The number of responses exceed 56 because of multiple answers.
Table 2
Use of Lease Financing in Small Firms
Number of Firms
Panel A: Percentage of Assets Financed by Leasing (n = 104)
Zero percent 48
0.1 to 5.0 percent 40
5.1 to 10.0 percent 5
10.1 to 20.0 percent 4
Over 20 percent 7
Panel B: Types of Leasing
Operating/Maintenance Leases 39
Fmancial/Capital Leases 33
Sale and T ^ s e  Back 7
Leveraged Leases 1
Other 3
external financing.^ Panel B of Table 2 shows that the number of firms 
using operating or maintenance leases (39 firms) slightly exceeds those 
that employ financial or capital leases (33 firms).
III. SURVEY FINDINGS 
To Lease or Not to Lease
Leasing and non-leasing firms are about evenly divided, with 56 
(53.8%) leasing firms and 48 (46.2%) non-leasing firms. To develop a 
profile of these two groups we form two-way tables based on some firm 
attributes.
The two-way tables and chi-squares statistics are presented in Table 3. 
The data depict that 24 out of 40 firms (or 60.0%) in the manufacturing 
sector lease as compared to 6 out of 20 firms (or 30.0%) in the utility 
sector. Similarly, the use of lease financing increases with geographical 
diversity (the chi-square statistics are statistically significant). Twenty -^ 
four of the fifty-six local or regional firms (or 42.9%) lease compared to 
31 out of 47 (or 66.0%) firms with nationwide or international 
operations. Mid-size firms appear to lease more than the firms in either 
the smallest or the largest categories. The largest proportion of leasing 
firms (61.5%) is in Group 3 (assets between $51 and $100 million) 
followed by 52.5 percent in Group 2 firms (assets between $11 and $50 
million).
Table 3 also indicates that small firms’ use of lease financing 
increases with their use of debt, suggesting a complementary relationship 
between the two types of financing. No clear relationship seems to exist 
between the extent of managerial ownership and the firm’s use of lease 
financing. Finally, the firms with a high sales growth in the recent past 
are more likely to lease than those with low sales growth.
To sum up, the leasing and non-leasing groups significantly differ 
from each other with respect to their geographical diversity, line of 
business activity, long term and secured debt ratios and sales growth. 
Chi-square tests reveal no clear pattern in the relationships between lease 
and either the insider ownership or the firm size.
Lease vs. Borrow Decision
Panel A of Table 4 indicates that a majority of firms (27 out of 48 or 
56%) either directly or indirectly (via consultants) perform quantitative 
analysis to decide about leasing. About one-fourth of the firms make
116 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 4(2/3) 1995
Ij'asing in Small Firms 117
I
I
I
•S
CO
I ”H u
• pN(X2
• c
y
0  
(3
1
s
• 4
00 00 *-H CO O  CM 05  J> l-H 00
CO o in  ^ CM CM r-H I> CO CM
if5 ^  o ^  q Oq r-H 00 o
d d d  d i-H d  N—✓ d
CM l > CM KO 1>  00 *-H(M i n 05  O »-H r-H l>
m  o 05  O 00  ^ 0 0  o
j >  d CM d i o  d d  d
l-H
•S
o
c«
(U
CO o r h  05 i>
00 J> 
g §  CM o
o x>
CO 1-H
CO CD l-Ht H 00 T l^
CM 1—H o
d Tj^ d
CM i n o m
i> CO CM l-H
o CO
in d Tt^ d
sg
g
b
O h
O
d
CO
O  05 
CO CM
o
CM
^  O ) _
<u
‘•w
bO
(D
Z
bo
•S rC« c/3
'55 cJ ^
4->
i
1 1  III
" 2
C(L>
sbe(U
c/3
X
<D
iS
-s
<u
-s
bo
•S 3
S 2
■S
. a  --
'5 g-
8  2
-o 'j:
 ^ ta  ^
t« ^  
’C t/5G <uW c/3U <D
22 S
-6  afHS O. 
cS.s
1 1  
^  s
Oh
V
i
c/3
JIS
I
I
a
u .
Table 4 
Leasing Analysis
Number of Firms
Panel A: Quantitative Analysis or Judgement? (Number of Usable Responses = 48)
1. We do not perform any type of quantitative analysis but rely on 13 
our judgement and experience.
2. We do not perform any quantitative analysis because we simply 8 
prefer to lease some type of assets.
3. We (or our consultants) do perform some type of quantitative 27 
analysis.
Panel B: Is Leasing is Investing or a Financing Decision? Number of Firms (n = 27)
1. Investing and Lease vs. Buy decisions are simultaneously 12 
determined.
2. Lease vs. Buy analysis is followed by the investing decisions. 12*
Panel C: Relationship between Leasing and Borrowing (n = 54)
1. Leasing is a substitute for borrowing. 5
2. Leasing complements borrowing and increases the firm's debt 26 
capacity.
3. Leasing has no bearing on firm’s borrowing. 23 
Note: *Six of these firms compute Net Advantage to Leasing (NAL).
leasing decisions based solely on judgement and experience. Panel B 
shows that the 27 firms which employ some type of quantitative analysis 
in their leasing decisions are equally divided in the way they perform 
lease analysis, with one half saying that leasing is a financing decision 
(lease analysis performed subsequent to the investment decision) and the 
other half considering it as an investment decision (investment and 
leasing analysis performed simultaneously). Six of the twelve firms that 
consider leasing as a financing decision compute Net Advantage to 
Leasing (NAL).
Lease evaluation models suggested in theory (see Myers, Dill, & 
Bautista, 1976) and in corporate finance textbooks (see Exhibit 1 of 
Mukherjee, 1991) are based on the premise that leasing and debt 
financing are substitutes for each other. Most small firms, however, do 
not share this view. Panel C of Table 4 shows that only nine percent of 
small firms view leasing as a substitute for debt compared to 48 percent 
of the firms saying that leasing complements debt financing.
Perceived Advantages of Leasing over Borrowing
Table 5 shows that more firms agree (or strongly agree) than 
disagree (or strongly disagree) with the statements:
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Table 5
Responses About Advantages of Leasing Over Borrowing (n = 56)
Survey Question: To what extent do you agree (or disagree) with the 
following statements regarding advantages of leasing over borrowing? (SA 
= Strongly Agree, A = Agree, SD = Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N 
= Neither Agree nor Disagree, NA = Not Applicable or Not Sure).
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Statement Mean*
5/4 or 
A
SD or 
D N NA
Leasing, unlike borrowing, avoids the risk of 
obsolescence.
3.25 32 13 3 4
Legal consequences of de&ult are less severe 
for leasing.
3.00 16 17 11 9
Generally, lease terms are more fevorable. 2.92 18 21 13 —
Frequently, equipment can be leased for 
longer periods.
3.02 16 17 18 —
Generally, lease covenants are less restrictive. 3.47 30 11 8 3
Tax advantage is the most important reason 
for leasing.
2.77 14 23 11 3
OfF-balance sheet accounting is an advantage 
of leasing.
4.00 41 6 2 3
Leasing provides 100% financing with no 
down payment.
3.69 35 6 7 3
Contracting costs are lower for leasing. 2.80 10 18 13 9
We prefer to lease because we are subject to 
Alternative Minimvim Tax.
2.62 5 17 17 11
Note: *Mean is computed on the basis of values for SA=5, A==4, N=3, D=2, and SD=1.
1) leasing avoids the risk of obsolescence;
2) lease covenants are less restrictive;
3) off-balance sheet accounting is an advantage of leasing; and
4) leasing provides 100 percent financing.
Approximately equal number of firms agree and disagree with the 
statement that the default consequences are less severe for leasing. By 
and large, firms do not view tax advantage as the most important reason 
for leasing. Fewer firms agree with the statement that contracting costs 
are lower for leasing. Payment of Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) does 
not appear to be a factor in the firms’ decision to lease.
Table 6 compares debt and lease financing in terms of some of the 
restrictive covenants faced by small firms. It is clear that restrictions 
imposed by creditors are more stringent than those imposed by lessors.^ 
More exacting nature of loan covenants is manifested in the restrictions
Table 6
Responses by Leasing Firms About Creditor and Lessor Restrictions (« = 56)
Survey Question: Please check the type of restrictions that may be placed by 
your firm’s creditors and lessors. (Leave blank if a restriction does not 
apply.)
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Restriction/Requirement By Creditors By Lessors
Restrictions on fiiture borrowing 23 2
Restrictions on additional leasing 8 7
Restrictions on dividends 18 2
Restrictions on fiiture investments 13 1
Minimum working capital requirement 20 5
Maximum debt to equity ratio 26 3
Seeking membership on firm’s board 2 1
Requiring more equity contributions 2 2
on the firm’s 1) future borrowing, 2) dividend payments, 3) future 
investments, and 4) maximum debt to equity ratio. Further, more firms 
are subject to minimum working capital requirements when borrowing 
than when leasing. In general, neither creditors nor lessors seek 
membership on the firm’s board or additional equity contributions from 
firm’s owners.
IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY DATA 
A Comparison of Leasing Practices Between Small vs. Large Firms
A comparison of the results of this survey with those of the 
Mukherjee (1991) survey on large firms leads us to make the following 
observations:
1. A large number of small firms do not lease. As much as 46 
percent small firms do not lease as compared to only 20 percent 
among large firms. This result is somewhat surprising as we 
expected smaller firms to rely more heavily on leasing. The 
predominantly non-manufacturing nature of the sample in this 
paper as opposed to emphasis on manufacturing firms in 
Mukherjee’s (1991) paper might partially explain the difference 
in lease participation between the two groups.
2. Small firms are less likely than large firms to perform a 
quantitative evaluation of the lease vs. borrow decision.
Approximately 96 percent of the lessees in the Mukherjee (1991) 
sample employ either NAL or IRR or both approaches to make 
their leasing decisions compared to only 12 percent of the small 
firms. Only nine percent of the large firms consider leasing and 
debt financing to be complementary, while 48 percent of small 
firms do so. Also, 88 percent of large firms view leasing as a 
financing decision as opposed to 50 percent of the small firms.
3. Mukherjee (1991) reports that most of the lessees in his sample 
“are motivated by what are considered to be “sensible” reasons 
for leasing” (p. 105). Many small firms, on the other hand, offer 
“dubious” reasons (such as off-balance-sheet accounting and 
100% financing) as advantages of leasing.
Gross-sectional Variations in Leasing
What are the determinants of the magnitude of lease financing by 
small firms? To answer this question, we performed regression analyses 
using the following two models:
LEASE =  flQ +  UiUTDEBT +  ci^ SIZiE +  a^R O F IT  +  a^GROWTH 
+ a^TAXRATE + a^GEOTYPE + e (1) 
LEASE = bo +  biSECDEBT + h^SIZE + h^^ROFIT + b^GROWTH 
+ b^TAXBATE + b^GEOTYPE -I- e (2)
where
and bi = the regression coejSicients;
LEASE = the proportion of firm’s assets financed with leasing; 
LTDEBT =  long-term debt to total assets;
SECDEBT = secured debt to total assets;
SIZE = firm size (total assets);
PROFIT = average annual net profit margin for the past three years; 
GROWTH =  average growth in annual sales for the past three years; 
TAXRATE = 3-year average of federal income taxes as a percentage 
of income before taxes;
GEOTYPE =  firm’s geographical diversity (local, regional, national, or 
international); and 
e = the random error term.
Once again the questionnaire is the source of all data items. Tlie 
correlation matrix of these variables is presented in Table 7 which
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indicates that leasing {LEASE) is positively correlated with long term debt 
(LTDEBT), secured debt (SECDEBT), firm size {SIZE), growth in sales 
{GROWTH), and the firm’s geographical diversity {GEOTYPE).
The regression results are presented in Table 8 .^  The two models 
estimated are the same except that long term debt {LTDEBT) is used as 
an explanatory variable in Model 1 and secured debt {SECDEBT) is used 
in Model 2. The F-Ratios are 3.384 and 4.126 for Models 1 and 2 
respectively and are statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
adjusted i?-Squares are 0.122 and 0.154 for Model 1 and Model 2. The 
F-Ratios and the adjusted i?-Squares indicate that the model with secured 
debt as a regressor has better explanatory power.
Both LTDEBT and SECDEBT variables have positive coefficients 
implying a complementary relationship between debt and lease 
financing. The complementary effect between secured debt and lease 
financing is stronger than the complementary relationship between long 
term debt and lease financing.®
The tax differential between the lessor and the lessee is often viewed 
as an important reason for the existence of leasing (e.g., see Brealey & 
Young, 1980; Drury & Braund, 1990 Lewellen, Long, & McConnell, 
1976; Miller & Upton, 1976). The lessor in a higher income tax bracket 
can purchase the asset, take advantage of the depreciation tax shelters 
and other benefits (e.g., salvage value and investment tax credit, if 
available), and pass on some of the benefit to the lessee in the form of 
lower lease payments. This implies that lessees would have lower income 
tax rates than lessors. Consequently, the lower the lessee’s tax rate the 
greater the likelihood of its usage of lease financing. Therefore, a 
negative relationship is expected between a firm’s tax rate and the 
amount of lease financing. Table 8 exhibits a weak negative relationship 
between the lessee firms’ tax rates and the proportion of their assets 
financed with leasing.
The variable reflecting geographical diversity of firms {GEOTYPE) 
has a positive sign and is significant at the five percent level. This 
suggests that firms with national and international operations use more 
lease financing than firms which are either local or regional. A firm’s 
amount of lease financing is positively related to its SIZE. This result is 
slightly different from that reported in Table 2.
The sign of the coefficient for PROFIT is negative and it is positive 
for GROWTH. Although the regression coefficients are not statistically 
significant, their signs are consistent with the Pecking Order Theory 
which suggests that a firm exhausts its internal sources of funding before
122 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 4(2/3) 1995
Leasing in Small Firms 123
OOO
o in r-H
o lOq o CO
r—( d o
o lO o
X—s
r-H
o (M o CO o
q O 00 CO o
r—t d d d d
1
—N
o CO o CO CO i-H CO
o m CM r-H o o
q 1—1 o 1—1 CM r-H CO
r—( d d d d d d
o o CO S ' 00 CO CM
o CM CO lO 05 o CO CO
q O 00 o ID CM o o CO
r—< d d d d d d d1d
o CO S" 00 CO lO o> CM CM 05
o j>o 0005 05 CM 05
q CM o o CO o CO o CO I-H o
d d d d d d d d d d
1 1 1 1
/----V
o 1-H I-H 00o CO m o S" CO
o »-H I-H o CO CM 1-H CO 00o> o 00q o 05 o 05 o ID o 00 o CO CM
i-H d d d d d d d d d d d d
1 1
X— -
o 05 CO CM t-H r-H S' 00 o CO
o X O o CO CM o »-H 00 o o •o CMq xO o I-H r-H CO o o 00 I-H CO I-H CM o 00
d d d
1
d d d d d d d d d d d
o CO S' xh o lO x>00 CO CO 00 CO 05 00 S'
o CO I-H CO o 00 00 lO 05 o CO CO r —<q CM O CM o CO I-H o o o >-H CM CM o
r-H d d d d d d d d
1
d d d d1d d d
oq
ic/3 C/3 g£ o X I§
<D
c
ncu
c
'£
IbO
P
124 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 4(2/3) 1995 
Table 8
Regression Analysis Using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Method (n -  104)
(Dependent Variable: LEASE)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
INTERCEPT 0.850* 0.657
(1.918) (1.476)
LTDEBT 0.159*
(1.925)
SECDEBT 0.159***
(2.744)
SIZE 0.129* 0.175**
(1.641) (2.387)
PROFIT -0.124 -0.102
(-1.115) (-0.939)
GROWTH 0.093 0.108
(1.023) (1.219)
TAXRATE -0.101 -0.109*
(-1.581) (-1.727)
GEOTYPE 0.168** 0.148**
(2.201) a . 970)
F-RATIO 3.384 4.126
ADJ. R-SQUARE 0.122 0.154
Notes: 7-Ratios are reported in parentheses below the respective 
parameter estimate. Statistical significance is indicated as:
1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent. All Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) are less than two.
raising funds externally. Similar relationships have been found between a 
firm’s debt proportion and PROFIT and GROWTH on the other.^
On the Relationship Between Debt and Lease Financing
Theoretical models developed by Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976), 
among others, are based on the premise that leasing is equivalent to 
borrowing because lease payments are fixed obligations similar to debt 
repayments and that leasing takes away the firm’s borrowing ability by 
the same amount. In this sense, leasing and borrowing are substitutes for 
each other. Others (Weingartner, 1987, for example) argue that, by 
conferring “use rights” on the lessee, the asset contributes to the cash 
flow of the firm similar to an owned asset and thus adds to the firm’s 
debt capacity. Smith and Wakeman (1985) argue that similar 
characteristics are probably important for determining the firm’s debt 
capacity as well as its leasing potential. As a result, both creditors and 
lessors may find the same set of firms attractive. Based on this line of
argument, one would expect a complementary relationship between 
debt and lease financing. Empirical findings on this issue have been 
contradictory. Ang and Peterson (1984) and Finucane (1988) find 
evidence in support of a complementary relationship. Marston and 
Harris (1988) and Bowman (1980) on the other hand find such 
relationship to be substitutive.
Mukherjee (1991) in his survey of large firms finds overwhelming 
support for the view that debt and lease financing are substitutes for 
each other. Based on the analysis of our survey results, however, we 
conclude that, for small firms at least, leasing complements debt. 
Results based on the two-way tables (Table 3), the correlation matrix 
(Table 7) and finally on the regression analysis (Table 8) clearly point to 
the complementary relationship. The evidence from regression analysis 
is more convincing as we control for the effect of other relevant 
variables on lease financing. Typically, because most small firms are 
closely held, they are under no obligation to make public the 
information pertinent to their operations. Consequently, monitoring 
costs for the suppliers of funds are relatively high. The lessor’s 
monitoring costs are reduced in the presence of external debt since a 
large portion of such costs are borne by creditors. The monitoring 
benefit may partially explain small firms’ complementary relationship 
between debt and lease.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we report and analyze survey results regarding leasing 
decisions of small U.S. firms. As the sample size is small, caution needs to 
be exercised in generalizing the results. With this caveat, we make the 
following observations.
• Small firms that lease are more likely to be relatively large 
manufacturing firms which exhibit higher debt ratios and sales 
growth. No clear pattern seems to exist in the relationships 
between the leasing and the extent of management ownership.
• Small firms are less likely than large firms to perform a 
quantitative evaluation of the lease vs. borrow decision. 
Approximately 96 percent of the lessees in the Mukheijee (1991) 
sample employ either or both NAL and IRR to make this decision 
compared to about 12 percent of the small firms. Also, small firms 
are more likely to offer “dubious” reasons (such as off-balance- 
sheet accounting and 100 percent financing) as advantages of
leasing. The use of operating leases by a large number of firms in 
our study might explain the importance assigned to off-balance 
sheet accounting as a motive to lease.
• Small firms report more stringent covenants in a loan agreement 
than in a lease agreement. Some of the common debt covenants are 
restrictions on future borrowing and dividend payments and 
maintenance of a minimum debt to equity ratio and working 
capital.
• Unlike large firms, 90 percent of small firms do not view lease as 
being substitute for debt. Our regression results confirm the 
complementary relationship between debt and lease financing. 
Reduced monitoring costs for lessors in the presence of external 
debt may partially explain this relation.
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NOTES
L Drury and Braund (1990), among otha-s, suggest that young companies which do not 
have an established track record may find it difficult to obtain finance fi-om financial 
institutions and banks. Such firms may find it easiCT to receive lease financing since the 
lessor keeps ownership rights to the leased asset.
2. Unfortunately, our questionnaire did not include a question to elicit this information.
3. NAL= The acquisition cost of the asset minus discounted values of a) after-tax lease 
payments, b) the foregone depreciation tax shield if leased, and c) the foregone 
interest tax shield.
4. Fmucane (1988) finds fewer restrictions for leasing than for borrowing in large firms as 
well.
5. Fairly low correlation coefficients among regressors (reported in Table 7) and small 
(less than two) Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) (not reported) imply that there is no 
serious problem of multicollinearity.
6. Using a TOBIT regression model, Finucane (1988) finds similar evidence for large 
firms.
7. For example, see Baskin’s (1989) work on large firms.
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